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Abstract 
This article provides an investigation into claims that paramilitary violence in Colombia 
can pose a threat to the peace agreement signed in 2016 between the Colombian government 
and the FARC rebels. These claims highlight the capacity for paramilitary groups to ‘spoil’ the 
peace deal. Hitherto, however, there is a lack of scholarly research to investigate the potential 
of paramilitary spoiling. Firstly, this article highlights the flaws in the government’s 
perspective that paramilitarism no longer exists in Colombia. Instead, the government argues 
that Colombia is plagued by criminal bands (known as BACRIMs). Secondly, through 
fieldwork interviews and questionnaires conducted in FARC demobilisation camps, together 
with descriptive data analysed through a uniquely coded dataset on violence in western 
Colombia, this article supports claims that successor paramilitary groups represent a key spoiler 
threat to the current government-FARC peace process. On the one hand, the paramilitaries can 
represent a direct spoiler threat by, for instance, violently targeting demobilising FARC 
guerrillas. On the other hand, successor paramilitary groups represent a key indirect spoiler 
threat, as paramilitary violence is exacerbating the root causes of the conflict that the peace 
deal seeks to address, with negative implications for the prospects for peace.  
2 
 
Introduction 
Since the 1960s, Colombia has endured a protracted civil war. Fought between the 
government of Colombia (GOC), their paramilitary allies and various left-wing guerrilla 
groups, the conflict has claimed the lives of scores of Colombians and led to acute suffering 
for millions of people. The GOC and the country’s largest and longest-lasting insurgent group, 
the left-wing Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia or FARC), began negotiations to end the decades-long conflict on August 
27th, 2012,1 after sixth months of exploratory dialogue. These talks began in October 2012 in 
Havana, Cuba and, after rejection in a national referendum, a revised landmark peace deal was 
signed by both parties in November 2016. The six-point GOC-FARC deal constitutes a 
comprehensive peace agreement addressing key areas of the conflict and formally marks the 
end of the conflict between the GOC and the FARC.  
There has been substantial optimism surrounding the implementation of the agreed 
terms as the FARC complete the process of disarmament and transition to a political party, the 
Fuerza Alternativa Revolucionaria del Común (same acronym – FARC). Yet significant 
concerns remain regarding the challenges to the peace deal.2 For example, some commentators 
point to the election of Iván Duque – who won Colombia’s presidential election in June 2018 
as a candidate for the right-wing Centro Democrático (Democratic Centre) party – as a 
potential obstacle to the peace process. Duque’s campaign promised reform of the current deal, 
including tougher penalties on former FARC members, and concerns are now growing that his 
hard-line stance could be detrimental to the GOC-FARC agreements.3 There have also been 
concerns regarding the GOC’s capacity to implement the terms of the agreement.4 Many other 
observers have focused on FARC dissidents’ refusal to join the peace process and demobilise. 
An estimated 800 to 1,000 former FARC members have not demobilised and it is hitherto 
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unclear if these groups will continue to espouse a left-wing political platform similar to the 
FARC or if they will concentrate on criminal activities such as the illegal drug trade.5  
However, another central concern that has emerged is the continued presence and 
expansion of Colombia’s right-wing paramilitary groups. Reports have warned that 
paramilitary groups (so-called BACRIMs, discussed below) may spoil Colombia’s current 
peace attempts by disrupting the implementation of the peace agreement, for instance, by 
directly targeting FARC members or by deterring people from getting involved in politics in 
Colombia’s marginalised regions.6 Up to this point, there has been a lack of academic research 
into the spoiler potential of Colombia’s new paramilitary groups.  
By drawing on the spoiler literature, this article aims to investigate spoiler claims that 
focus on the threat of paramilitary groups to the peace process. The analysis in this article, on 
the one hand, shows that successor paramilitary groups pose a direct spoiler threat to the peace 
process by intentionally challenging the peace deal. On the other hand, this article attempts to 
provide a deeper understanding of the paramilitary threat by discussing indirect spoiler activity. 
Little attention has been given to the less obvious (yet no less significant) threat of potential 
indirect spoiler actions in the wider spoiler literature, as well as in the specific case of the 
Colombian peace process.  
We highlight two ways in which paramilitary violence could serve to indirectly spoil 
peace. First, the analysis shows that paramilitary groups still represent a powerful fighting 
force. They have expanded their presence and levels of violence in many regions of Colombia, 
including those contested by warring parties. The data suggest that successor paramilitary 
violence threatens the ability of the GOC to address issues of victims of political violence and 
to effectively terminate the conflict.7 Secondly, paramilitary groups continue to violently 
acquire land through forced displacement and have resisted land restitution efforts, obstructing 
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the implementation of the GOC-FARC agreements on land reform, as well as exacerbating the 
root causes of the conflict (land inequality and issues pertaining to access to land).  
The following analysis consists of fieldwork in Colombia, primarily focused on in-
depth interviews and questionnaires with FARC members (20 respondents) across three 
demobilisation camps or transition zones (Zonas Veredales Transitorias de Normalización) in 
April and July 2017, before and during the disarmament process. We also interviewed former 
paramilitary AUC leaders (see Appendix 3). The analysis further employs a uniquely-coded 
dataset on political violence in western Colombia (discussed in more detail below and in the 
Appendices). The data support claims made by respondents. While much of this information 
from interviews and corresponding datasets help support our arguments and observations about 
Colombia, we unpack some of the theoretical-empirical implications of our analysis in the 
conclusion to provide possible generalisable areas for future research into how inter-field 
rivalries between actors such as insurgents and pro-government militias may shape peace 
processes.   
 
Spoiling peace 
Peace processes are notoriously precarious affairs. A key obstacle to peace negotiations 
is the effect of ‘spoilers’, groups that seek to challenge peace processes. In his seminal article, 
Stedman defines spoilers as ‘leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from 
negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine 
attempts to achieve it in the context of peace processes.’8 Spoilers may operate inside or outside 
negotiations and use a variety of tactics to spoil peace attempts including violent and non-
violent tactics.9 In addition to this, scholars have noted a distinction between direct and indirect 
spoiling activity.10 Direct spoiling actions constitute intentional challenges to peace attempts. 
Indirect spoiling refers to violence that ‘may be directed towards seemingly non-political 
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objectives and yet have very real political consequences as a by-product.’11 Spoiling behavior 
can thus include violent activities that are not directly aimed at undermining peace attempts 
but that nevertheless negatively affect the prospects for peace. 
Spoilers can be particularly salient in conflicts with multiple warring parties.  Research 
has shown that the presence of many actors at the bargaining table makes it more difficult to 
reach an agreement.12 Similarly, Nilsson argues that warring parties excluded from peace 
processes often continue violence and increase the likelihood of spoiler activity.13  In addition, 
continued violent rivalries between sub-state armed groups can contribute to these groups’ 
longevity and potentially serve to spoil peace processes. Phillips argues that ‘interfield’ 
rivalries (when competitors espouse substantially different political goals) have greater impact 
on actor longevity than ‘intrafield’ rivalries (when rivals are from the same broader 
movement).14 Indeed, inter-group violence and interactions between sub-state forces have often 
proved difficult to manage and overcome in peace processes around the world. Where peace 
processes have been successful in the presence of anti-insurgent militias, for example, peace 
negotiations were further complicated. For instance, in Northern Ireland, substantial 
coordination was required between all armed actors, but particularly between the IRA and 
loyalist paramilitary groups, before the decommissioning of arms was possible.15 In the Sudan, 
pro-government militias continued to attack oppositional forces in spite of a government-
insurgent ceasefire, culminating in a re-ignition of conflict.16 
 
Paramilitary-insurgent inter-field rivalry and spoiling previous peace processes  
The presence of multiple armed groups has complicated Colombia’s conflict and many 
of the country’s previous attempts at peace. Numerous powerful left-wing guerrilla 
organisations such as the FARC, ELN (Ejercito Liberación Nacional), and M-19, among many 
others, have often competed among one another despite relatively similar objectives (i.e. intra-
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field rivalry). However, the rise of paramilitary groups has had a significant effect on conflict 
dynamics. Modern paramilitarism developed as an anti-insurgent movement connected to the 
state’s counterinsurgency efforts and interests of large landholder property owners and drug 
traffickers.17 Furthermore, in contrast to the FARC’s objectives, the paramilitaries have aspired 
to ‘defend the interests of powerful domestic and international economic actors’ and espouse a 
‘fiercely anti-communist’ ideology.18 Paramilitarism has represented part of a larger right-wing 
political force that infamously manifested itself in the form of the ‘para-politica’ scandal.19 
These sets of interests and corresponding worldview contribute to a powerful inter-field rivalry 
between the paramilitaries and the FARC over the direction of Colombian politics.20 The 
emergence of the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), the right-wing pro-government 
militia paramilitary umbrella organisation in the 1990s, epitomised the anti-insurgent and anti-
subversive nature of these forces. The AUC had well-documented unofficial and clandestine 
links with Colombia’s armed forces and the country’s political establishment in an alliance 
against the FARC, other insurgent forces, and progressive social movements.21 The FARC and 
other insurgent movements have, in turn, considered paramilitary forces among their greatest 
enemies and have often violently retaliated against them, their supporters and benefactors. 
As a consequence of this insurgent-paramilitary rivalry, Colombia’s paramilitary 
groups have acted as spoilers during multiple previous GOC-insurgent peace attempts. For 
instance, paramilitary forces challenged the GOC-FARC peace process during the former 
president Belisario Betancur’s administration (in office: 1982–1986) by systematically 
targeting members of the Unión Patriotica (UP), the left-wing political party founded by the 
FARC and the Colombian Communist Party.22 An estimated 2,000 to over 3,000 UP members 
were murdered between 1986 and 1995, including the assassinations of two of the UP’s 
presidential candidates.23 This annihilation of the UP left the FARC ‘more radicalised than 
ever’.24 In light of the dirty war waged against the UP, as well as armed conflagrations between 
7 
 
the GOC and the FARC, the ceasefire between the state and the guerrillas collapsed in 1987, 
early on in the presidency of Virgilio Barco (in office: 1986-1990).  
Despite the failure to create peace with the FARC, in 1988 Barco launched a peace 
process with other armed groups, a process that concluded during the presidency of Cesar 
Gaviria (in office: 1990-1994). While the GOC continued fighting against the FARC and the 
ELN, this peace process was successful in demobilising thousands of rebel soldiers from a 
number of other guerrilla organisations, namely guerrillas from M-19 (of which 791 guerrillas 
demobilised), the EPL (2,149 guerrillas), CRS (433 guerrillas), PRT (205 guerrillas), and 
MAQL (148 guerrillas).25 During this period, the paramilitaries undertook serious spoiling 
actions,26 occasionally in collaboration with sections of the armed forces opposed to peace.27 
For instance, in addition to the targeting of leftist political groups such as the UP, the 
paramilitaries were responsible for the assassination of Carlos Pizarro, M-19’s chief 
commander, in 1990.28  
 Violent paramilitary-FARC inter-group interactions also hindered the peace initiatives 
of President Andrés Pastrana (in office: 1998-2002). As Bouvier notes, paramilitaries were 
‘involved in two out of three occasions when the FARC unilaterally suspended negotiations, 
thereby causing serious delays in the peace process.’29 More specifically, in January 1999, the 
AUC embarked on a killing spree that resulted in over 137 deaths, coinciding with the initiation 
of GOC-FARC peace negotiations. The FARC then unilaterally suspended the peace talks 12 
days after they were initiated and demanded that the GOC tackle paramilitary groups. The 
GOC-FARC negotiations stalled for a further five-month period.30 Moreover, in October 2000, 
during GOC-FARC negotiations on a prisoner exchange, the AUC kidnapped six Colombian 
politicians in the hope of preventing the Colombian Congress from passing a law aimed at 
freeing FARC guerrillas.31 On these occasions, the FARC demanded that the government take 
firmer steps against the paramilitaries before peace talks could resume. Paramilitary forces also 
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undertook similar direct spoiling activity during the government peace processes with other 
insurgent groups in Colombia. Similarly, inter-group violence between paramilitary forces and 
the ELN continued during GOC-ELN negotiations in 1999. During this period, the GOC agreed 
to a demilitarised zone for the ELN.32 As Bouvier notes, the paramilitaries ‘prevented 
demilitarization both through violence and by sponsoring mass mobilizations and blockages of 
highways’, which stalled negotiations.33  
In summary, inter-group violence particularly between anti-insurgent paramilitaries 
and insurgent groups, such as the FARC, have hindered brokering durable peace in Colombia.  
Competing ideologies, worldviews, and sets of powerful interests among such groups have 
made for cycles of violence that has proven difficult to break. Moreover, the GOC’s often 
contradictory position, negotiating for peace on the one hand with connections to paramilitary 
forces on the other hand, has complicated efforts to make peace and made it difficult for the 
government to commit and fully enforce the terms of each ceasefire/agreement.  
 
The continuation of paramilitarism 
Prima facie, the potential for paramilitary spoiling of the current GOC-FARC peace 
process may appear unlikely. Between 2003 and 2006, the AUC reached an agreement with 
the GOC to demobilise. By 2006, the GOC claimed that over 30,000 paramilitary members had 
relinquished their weapons. The GOC also subsequently supported paramilitary reintegration 
programs through the Colombian Agency for Reintegration. Some AUC leaders were 
extradited to the United States and imprisoned on drug trafficking charges. Subsequently, 
according to the official GOC narrative, paramilitarism no longer existed in Colombia.  Instead, 
the GOC posited that armed groups that emerged from the demobilisation process were 
‘criminal gangs’ (known as BACRIMs) and not paramilitary groups. 
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However, critics have demonstrated that the paramilitary demobilisation process was 
deeply flawed from its inception and enabled powerful successor paramilitary groups to emerge 
throughout Colombia.34  Groups such as  Los Urabeños, who are often referred to as Las 
Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC) or El Clan del Golfo (Gulf Clan), Aguilas 
Negras, Los Puntilleros (formerly ERPAC), La Constru, Los Rastrojos, Paisas, and Nueva 
Generacion, among many others, emerged immediately following the demobilisation process 
and have quickly expanded their presence across Colombia.35  By 2010, successor paramilitary 
groups had an estimated 4,000–10,000 members and exhibited high levels of violence.36 In 
2014, Colombia’s Ombudsman observed that these groups have expanded their presence and 
are active in approximately 15% of Colombia’s territory, with a presence in 27 of the country’s 
32 departments.37 During 2017, Colombia’s paramilitary forces have continued to expand their 
control over territories left by the FARC following the peace agreement.38 
The dismantling of the AUC and the rise of these successor groups have fragmented 
the landscape of paramilitarism in Colombia.  According to Ariel Ávila and the Fundación Paz 
y Reconciliación, there are generally three types of successor paramilitary organisations.  
Firstly, groups or structures which did not demobilise; secondly, groups that entered the process 
but rearmed; and thirdly, entirely new groups that have formed. 39 Often, successor groups are 
led by AUC fighters who did not demobilise.40 Former AUC leader Ernesto Baez warned the 
GOC in a letter sent from prison in 2006 that many former AUC mid-level commanders had 
continued to operate paramilitary groups and had begun recruitment into them.41  
Many of these forces have different objectives and consequently represent a potential 
threat to the contemporary GOC-FARC peace process to different extents. Los Urabeños 
represent one of the biggest threats to the peace process, with approximately 3,000 to 5,000 
members and a presence in 22 of Colombia’s 32 departments. The group operates permanent 
military structures in many regions and is deeply involved in the illegal drug trade.42 Similarly, 
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the Águilas Negras (Black Eagles) successor group has established a significant presence 
across Colombia, with the group’s name appearing in 10 to 20 departments of Colombia.43 In 
light of the group’s political discourse, it represents a particular threat to the peace process 
(discussed in more detail below). Other significant groups include Los Puntilleros, a group 
which has consolidated its presence in the departments of Meta, Guaviare, and Vichada and is 
deeply involved in narcotrafficking.44 Other groups have territorially benefitted from the 
FARC’s demobilisation, such as La Constru which has expanded in southern Putumayo and 
Nariño and now controls the drug trade in these areas.  
The GOC has posited that the armed groups which emerged from the paramilitary 
demobilisation process are ‘criminal gangs’ (known as BACRIMs) and not paramilitary 
groups. However, while there are differences, such as an absence of the more centralised 
organisational structure of the AUC compared to the current (more fragmented) landscape of 
paramilitarism in Colombia, many of these successor paramilitary groups continue to operate 
in similar ways as their AUC predecessors.45 CODHES notes that successor paramilitary 
groups ‘practice the same “modus operandi” of traditional paramilitarism.’46 For instance, as 
with the AUC, successor paramilitary groups ‘continue to use extra-judicial killings, forced 
displacement, disappearances, intimidation and threats to influence the activities of various 
movements jockeying for social reform such as labor unions, workers organizations and 
others,’ often denouncing and targeting these groups as guerrillas or FARC sympathisers.47 
And like the AUC, successor paramilitary groups are deeply involved in the illegal drug trade. 
Many successor groups have also continued to express a political platform.48  
One former AUC leader confirmed that successor paramilitary groups share much in 
common with the former AUC paramilitary structures.49 Many of the high-level commanders 
of successor groups are former AUC personnel, such as Dairo Antonio Usuga, alias “Otoniel” 
the current leader of Los Urabeños. They also continue to espouse an anti-subversive ideology 
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and political stance. The respondent believed that the new paramilitary groups will oppose the 
peace process and FARC participation in politics whenever possible. However, the former 
leader argued that this new generation of paramilitary fighters might be more dangerous than 
ever before.  While the AUC had close relationships with the state, some successor paramilitary 
members now distrust the GOC due to the way in which the paramilitary demobilisation 
process was handled and how the GOC reneged on some of its promises to the paramilitaries, 
including extraditing many AUC leaders to the US.  
Similarly, in in-depth interviews and questionnaires with demobilising FARC 
members, all 20 interviewees perceived that the so-called ‘BACRIMs’ were a continuation of 
paramilitarism, rather than purely criminal entities.50 As one FARC respondent put it: 
‘BACRIM is the name given to the different actors that have continued the work of the 
paramilitaries: dispossessing, displacing and killing the population. We see BACRIM and 
paramilitaries as in the same category.’51 Another respondent stated that ‘BACRIMs act like 
the paramilitaries through displacement of the population, torture, [by being] the “machine of 
destruction”, [by] looting, [by carrying out] the war of appropriation of land in the interests of 
the most powerful’.52  ‘For us’, another respondent stated, ‘BACRIMs and paramilitaries are 
the same because they have the same politics’.53 
While the ties between the state and paramilitary groups have certainly evolved since 
the existence of the AUC, some successor paramilitary groups continue to maintain unofficial 
links to various local Colombian state institutions.54  In her detailed analysis of successor 
paramilitary groups, Hristov provides evidence that some of Colombia’s state institutions 
continue to exhibit complicity, tolerance, collaboration and direct participation in successor 
paramilitary activities. For instance, active police and military personnel have collaborated 
with – and have directly participated alongside – successor paramilitary forces. Hristov also 
highlights the continued links between Colombian politicians and successor paramilitary 
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groups, which includes political alliances, paramilitary financing of local election campaigns, 
the embezzlement of public funds that are diverted to paramilitary groups, and paramilitary 
infiltration of state institutions such as INCODER.55 As Hristov argues, ‘to reduce present-day 
illegal armed groups to “criminal gangs” is a gross distortion of reality’.56 Unlike BACRIMs, 
criminal gangs ‘do not have the kind of solid relationship with judicial, political and military 
state institutions that is necessary to secure impunity for their crimes, provide them with 
ammunition, facilitate their operations, and convert illegally accumulated wealth into legal 
capital.’57  
 
The potential for direct paramilitary spoiling  
Direct spoiling activity constitutes action intentionally taken to derail a peace process.58 
Throughout GOC-FARC negotiations, as well as in the implementation phase up to the point 
of writing, a number of successor paramilitary groups have been opposed to the peace process 
and have undertaken actions intended to undermine it. In this way, the activities of some 
successor paramilitary groups are carried out with the specific intention of jeopardising the 
GOC-FARC peace process and forms part of a concerted effort to see the process fail. For 
example, in May 2015, Colombian senator Ivan Cepeda alleged that individuals opposed to the 
peace process held secretive talks to create a special anti-peace-process paramilitary group.59 
In March 2015, the Aguilas Negras issued death threats to 14 prominent politicians that 
supported the peace process, including Senators Ivan Cepeda and Claudia Lopez, as well as the 
then Mayor of Bogota, Gustavo Petro.60 GOC representatives also accused successor 
paramilitaries of attempting to derail the GOC-FARC peace talks by threatening journalists 
and conflict investigators.61  
During the GOC-FARC negotiations, the FARC cited the continuation of paramilitary 
groups as a central fear of the rebel group and one of the core obstacles facing the peace talks 
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and the implementation of the agreements down the line.62 The FARC also asserted that the 
need for the GOC to address paramilitarism extends beyond the paramilitary targeting of rebel 
soldiers in the reincorporation process. Dealing with paramilitary groups, according to the 
FARC delegation in Havana, is ‘a prerequisite for the free activity of political parties, trade 
unions and social movements in Colombia.’63 This includes the newly formed FARC political 
group.   
The fieldwork conducted for this article supports the FARC’s official concerns 
regarding paramilitarism. Interviewed FARC rebels expressed significant concerns for their 
security and reprisals from paramilitary actors during and looking beyond the FARC’s 
disarmament. In interviews, all FARC members expressed concerns that the successor 
paramilitaries will target demobilising guerrillas as they began to relinquish their weapons, as 
well as target members of the FARC’s political party. Furthermore, 16 respondents thought 
that this violence could resemble the endemic violent campaign waged against the UP during 
the 1980s and 1990s (as discussed above). In this light, the respondents’ memory regarding the 
historical record of previous peace processes – including paramilitary threats to demobilising 
guerrillas – has an impact on the respondents’ interpretation of the challenges to the current 
GOC-FARC deal and the threat posed by successor paramilitary groups. Respondents also 
raised concerns about the Colombian government’s links to successor paramilitary groups.64 
One FARC negotiator who was present during the negotiations in Havana alleged the GOC 
was unwilling to entirely restructure local government offices with links to paramilitary forces 
and that the FARC’s security concerns have been compounded by the GOC’s lack of the 
resources and infrastructure needed to provide comprehensive security to FARC members 
during their transition and disarmament.65 
In questionnaires completed by FARC members in transition camps, when asked to 
score the level of threat that different groups (namely, neo-paramilitaries/BACRIM, 
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demobilised paramilitaries, the public armed forces, and the ELN) pose to the respondents’ 
personal security, respondents clearly identified neo-paramilitaries/BACRIMs as the greatest 
threat. As Figure 1 shows, scoring on a scale of 0 to 100 (where 0 = ‘no threat’ and 100 = ‘the 
greatest threat’), successor paramilitary groups scored an average of 82, followed by 
paramilitary members who were deemed to have demobilised (an average score of 67), the 
public armed forces (51), and the ELN (19).  
 
Figure 1. Perceived level of threat to respondents’ personal security by armed group (scale 1 
to 100, where 0 = ‘no threat’ and 100 = ‘the greatest threat’). 
  
Source: fieldwork (questionnaire) 
 
Respondents were also asked to identify the level of threat that they believe the 
aforementioned groups pose to (1) the peace process, (2) the respondents’ community, (3) to 
progressive social movements and trade unions (i.e., civil groups), and (4) politicians who will 
represent the respondents in the future. As Figure 2 shows, scoring on a scale of 1 to 5 (where 
1 = ‘total disagreement’ and 5 = ‘total agreement’), respondents strongly agreed that successor 
paramilitary groups pose the greatest threat to the peace process (an average score of 4.9), the 
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respondents’ community (average: 4.9), progressive social movements and trade unions (4.9), 
and politicians representing the respondents in the future (with all respondents scoring 5). The 
responses also show a suspicion of demobilised paramilitaries in Colombia (see also Figure 1).  
 
Figure 2. Average scores of respondent’s agreement/disagreement to the threat that different 
armed groups pose to (1) the peace process, (2) the respondents’ community, (3) 
civil groups and (4) politicians representing the respondents in the future (scale 1 
to 5, where 1 = ‘total disagreement’ and 5 = ‘total agreement’). 
Source: fieldwork (questionnaire) 
When respondents were asked to agree/disagree to statements on who they viewed as their 
enemy (Figure 3), neo-paramilitaries/BACRIMs scored the highest. From a scale of 1 to 5 
(where 1 = ‘total disagreement’ and 5 = ‘total agreement’), neo-paramilitaries scored an 
average of 4.4, followed by demobilised paramilitaries (3.6), the government’s armed forces 
(2.5), and the ELN (1.4). As one respondent stated: ‘The paramilitaries have always been [our] 
enemy, for many years’.66  
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Figure 3. Average respondent scores regarding who they believe is their enemy (scale 1 to 5, 
where 1 = ‘total disagreement’ and 5 = ‘total agreement’).  
 
Source: Fieldwork (questionnaire) 
Supporting the validity of these concerns, successor paramilitary groups have explicitly 
threatened to kill former FARC fighters who are reintegrating into Colombian society and have 
targeted other sectors of society, such as social movement leaders and human rights activists.67 
While the numbers differ according to the source, between November 2016 and July 2017, a 
total of five FARC members were reported to have been killed and many more threatened.68 
By 5 October 2017, 14 murders of ex-FARC members were reported in Colombia (namely, in 
Cauca, Nariño, Caquetá, Antioquia, Chocó and Tolima) since the peace agreement was 
implemented. The FARC have cited ‘paramilitary expansion’ as the reason for these 
assassinations.69 On 15 October 2017, six demobilising FARC members were assassinated in 
Nariño.70  
Assassinations of demobilising FARC members continue to rise. On 22 May 2018, 
Colombia’s president Juan Manuel Santos stated that 40 demobilising FARC members had 
been assassinated since the peace deal was signed.71 The murders of demobilising guerrillas 
have created a narrative among the ranks of the FARC that it is safer for demobilising rebels 
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to remain in the rural transition zones than to return to Colombia’s cities. The families of 
demobilising FARC members have also been targeted.72 Furthermore, president Santos noted 
the assassinations of 261 social leaders between January 2016 and April 2018.73 In 2017, 120 
social leaders were murdered, representing the deadliest year on record for human rights 
defenders in Colombia, with paramilitaries increasingly targeting social activists.74  
Assuaging the fears of demobilising FARC members will be crucial to the success of 
the GOC-FARC peace accord. Indeed, the GOC-FARC agreement seeks to address, among 
other things, the security of FARC members from threats posed by successor paramilitary 
groups. Interestingly, the agreements reference both ‘criminal groups’ as well as 
‘paramilitaries’, representing a shift in GOC discourse towards acknowledging the continued 
existence of paramilitary forces (rather than dismissing them as purely criminal entities – 
BACRIM).75 The GOC agreed to an ‘integrated system to guarantee security’ of members of 
the FARC participating in the reincorporation process, with an agreement that the government 
would dismantle paramilitary groups and address current local government ties to such forces.  
Subsequent to these agreements, the GOC has approved various decrees establishing new 
bodies to combat paramilitarism and criminal activities towards an end to the conflict, such as 
the ‘Comision Nacional de Garantias de Seguridad’ or a National Commission for the 
Guarantees of Security and an elite police force to tackle paramilitary forces.76 The GOC has 
also begun to implement governmental reforms to dismantle GOC-paramilitary ties in certain 
areas such as Buenaventura and Tumaco.  
This possibility for direct paramilitary spoiling should be understood within the larger 
frame of the struggle for the future of Colombian politics in which ‘some conservative political 
sectors that have a militarised approach to the conflict and foresee a political and electoral 
strengthening of the left.’77 Paramilitary forces have traditionally served as the coercive spear-
head against left-wing armed groups as well as civil movements and activists.  Looking 
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forward, if the FARC is to successfully participate in Colombian politics via the creation of a 
new political party, they will require security assurances to ensure that they will not be targeted 
as the UP was during the FARC’s previous attempts to enter Colombian politics.  
 
Indirect paramilitary spoiling 
As noted in the introduction, we argue that continued paramilitary violence serves as a 
potential indirect spoiler threat to the current GOC-FARC peace process. Paramilitary violence 
in general, rather than that intentionally aimed at spoiling the peace process, exacerbates and 
perpetuates many of the root causes of the conflict that the current agreement addresses and 
may serve as an obstacle for the GOC to effectively implement the agreed terms of the GOC-
FARC negotiation. We highlight two principal ways in which paramilitary violence could serve 
to indirectly spoil peace. First, this paper demonstrates that paramilitaries still represent a 
powerful fighting force and have expanded their territorial control over regions contested by 
warring parties. This supports a number of the concerns of FARC respondents that were raised 
in interviews and questionnaires regarding successor paramilitary groups (as discussed above). 
Successor paramilitary groups are responsible for the majority of victims of political violence 
which threatens the ability of the GOC to address the issue of victims of political violence and 
to put an end to the armed conflict as agreed in the peace negotiations. Secondly, paramilitary 
groups have continued the violent acquisition of land via forced displacement and have resisted 
land restitution efforts, both of which threaten to undermine the ability of the GOC to fully 
implement crucial terms of the GOC-FARC agreement around land reform, as well as 
exacerbate the root causes of the conflict.  
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Paramilitary expanded presence and operations 
According to numerous reports, successor paramilitary groups are gaining territorial 
control in areas where the FARC have left, taxing local residents (vacuna) and controlling illicit 
businesses such as illegal mines and drug trafficking.78  In addition, violence over territorial 
control between the FARC and successor paramilitary groups intensified in contested areas 
during the negotiations.79  CINEP’s data record a number of instances of conflict between the 
FARC and successor paramilitary groups. For example, in Chocó in January 2014, combat 
between the FARC’s 57th Front and the Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (also known 
as the Urabeños) led to the displacement of over 80 people. In September 2014, armed conflict 
between the FARC, successor paramilitary groups and the public armed forces led to the 
displacement of 986 people in Valle Del Cauca. In Nariño, March 2016, 90 people were 
displaced as a result of fighting between the FARC and successor paramilitary groups.  
Overall, hundreds of thousands of people across Colombia have been victims of 
violence perpetrated by successor paramilitary groups. Between 2006 and 2016, 332,149 
people had registered with the Colombian government as victims of BACRIM violence.80 To 
further investigate current levels of paramilitary violence, we present data that cover an eight-
year period (2009-2016) on Human Rights violations and Political Violence (henceforth: 
HRPV) published by a Colombian human rights group, Centro de Investigación y Educación 
Popular (CINEP).81 We focus on 10 departments that cover the majority of Western Colombia 
and we have further analysed CINEP’s data to provide a uniquely coded dataset. These data 
are disaggregated to the department level for the departments of Antioquia, Atlántico, Bolívar, 
Chocó, Córdoba, Magdalena, Nariño, Putumayo, Sucre and Valle Del Cauca (see Appendix 2). 
The analysis covers regions where the public security forces, right-wing paramilitaries, and the 
FARC all have a presence and vie for territorial control. While this data can highlight the 
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centrality of these groups’ interaction, it also highlights that the conflict has continued to create 
many victims of violence, with implications for peace (discussed below).  
As Table 1 shows, successor paramilitary forces have been responsible for the majority 
(65% of the total) of HRPV victims in the departments analysed when compared to other armed 
groups. Figure 4 shows the concentration of much of this violence in Antioquia and Valle del 
Cauca,82 areas where there is strong competition between Colombia’s armed groups.  
 
Table 1. HRPV victims by armed group, 2009-2016 
Armed group Number of victims % of total 
Public Forces 2,936 20% 
Paramilitaries 9,381 65% 
Combined Public-Para 133 1% 
ELN 1,292 9% 
FARC-EP 713 5% 
Guerrilla unspec. 28 0% 
Total 14,483 100% 
Source: Data adapted from Banco de Datos de Derechos Humanos y Violencia Política del 
CINEP (n.d.) 
 
 
Figure 4. HRPV victims, 2009-2016 
 
Source: Data adapted from Banco de Datos de Derechos Humanos y Violencia Política del 
CINEP (n.d.) 
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Since the peace talks began (2012), there was a sharp increase in the number of HRPV 
victims recorded; however, the intensity of violence varies during different periods. In 2011, 
702 victims were recorded, rising to 2,813 in 2012 and peaking at 5,051 victims in 2013 
(Figures 5 and 6), respectively. While the number of victims fell to 514 in 2014, the figure rose 
again in 2015, when 2,332 victims were recorded. The figure then fell to 447 victims in 2016. 
Paramilitary forces were responsible for much of this violence during this period, including 
episodes of mass forced displacement and death threats to members of civil organisations such 
as trade unions. Specifically, in the period 2012-2016 (i.e., after the peace talks were 
announced), 7,894 HRPV victims (71% of the total) were attributed as victims of paramilitary 
actions, followed by 1,839 (16% of the total) attributed to the actions of Colombia’s public 
armed forces, 729 (7% of the total) to the FARC, and 651 (6% of the total) to the ELN.83  As 
Figures 5 and 6 indicate, while the levels of paramilitary violence varied in the 2012-2016 
period, ranging from acute levels of violence in some years (2012, 2013 and 2015) to relatively 
lower levels of HRPV victims in other years (2011, 2014 and 2016), it is nevertheless evident 
that paramilitary actions have been responsible for the majority of HRPV victims in these 
contested regions during this period.  
While the reason for the fall in HRPV victims and paramilitary violence in 2014 and 
2016 is not immediately apparent, it is worth noting that spikes in violence can often be 
followed by lulls in conflict intensity – including levels of human rights violations and forced 
displacement – which is consistent with longer-term patterns in Colombia’s conflict.  Previous 
research has also highlighted how levels of paramilitary violence often rise when paramilitary 
groups expand their operations into new areas but, once their presence is consolidated, levels 
of violence subsequently fall.84  
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Figure 5. Victims of HRPV by responsible armed group, 2009–2016 
Source: Data adapted from Banco de Datos de Derechos Humanos y Violencia Política del 
CINEP (n.d.) 
 
Figure 6. Victims of HRPV by responsible armed group, 2011–2016 
 
Source: Data adapted from Banco de Datos de Derechos Humanos y Violencia Política del 
CINEP (n.d.) 
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These high levels of paramilitary activity can present problems for the current peace 
process. Continued paramilitary violence along with violence perpetrated by other groups can 
result in a ‘partial peace’.85 The GOC-FARC peace deal has brought an end to the FARC as an 
armed group. Yet, paramilitary violence continues, and the GOC remains in negotiations with 
the ELN under a bi-lateral ceasefire called on 5 September 2017. There remains a lot of work 
to be done if full peace is to be reached. Moreover, paramilitary violence, in the context of a 
rivalry with the FARC, can potentially serve to undermine the current GOC-FARC agreements. 
Continued paramilitary presence and violence in contested areas can provide new incentives 
for members of the FARC to return to fighting, create renewed group solidarity and provide a 
pool of potential new recruits. As Leech notes, ‘While some peasants join the FARC because 
of a lack of economic opportunity, others enlist in order to escape repression by the state or 
paramilitaries.’86 Indeed, in response to paramilitary violence, some dissident FARC factions 
that did not join the peace process have allegedly formed the Fuerzas Irregulares Armadas de 
Colombia (FIAC), an anti-paramilitary organisation that declared war on successor 
paramilitary groups.87 Similarly, increased actions by the guerrillas can also galvanise the 
support of and recruitment for the paramilitaries. This could lead to a vicious circle of violence.  
 
The continuation of forced displacement 
As a consequence of paramilitary expansion, a number of other issues arise that 
indirectly challenge the GOC-FARC peace process. Successor groups have employed 
widespread forced displacement as a strategy to expand and consolidate their territorial control.  
Successor paramilitaries have forcibly displaced large swathes of campesinos and the 
abandoned land is subsequently used for a variety of illegal (such as coca cultivation) and legal 
(such as palm oil) commercial activities.88 As will be discussed, this indirectly threatens the 
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GOC’s ability to implement parts of the GOC-FARC agreement and aggravates some of the 
root causes of the conflict.  
Forced displacement is achieved through ‘selective assassinations, coercion, and 
intimidation’ to expand ‘territorial control vis-à-vis the guerrillas and gaining control of areas 
of economic interest’.89 Displacement in Colombia is not a ‘by-product’ of the conflict but is 
instead a concerted strategy of war.90  Moreover, the majority of forced displacement in 
Colombia has been perpetrated by paramilitaries.91 As many scholars have noted, this is often 
connected to the interests of large landowners and international business.92  
According to data the GOC’s Single Registry of Victims (Registro Único de Víctimas 
or RUV), a total of 7.8 million were displaced in Colombia between 1985 and 2016.93 This 
represents approximately 16% of Colombia’s total population.94 Forced displacement 
intensified during the 2000s: of the total number of historic IDPs recorded, 64% were displaced 
between 2000-2009, according to the RUV. Furthermore, between 2007 and 2016, after the 
paramilitary demobilisation process had concluded (2003-2006), approximately 2.6 million 
people were forcibly displaced in Colombia.  
 
Figure 7. Cumulative IDPs in Colombia, 2000-2016 
Source: RUV, n.d. 
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As Table 2 shows, forced displacement has been high in the 10 departments analysed 
above. In the period 2006-2016, approximately 1.7 million people were forcibly displaced in 
these departments. Moreover, between 2007 and 2016 (i.e., post-paramilitary demobilisation), 
1.5 million IDPs were recorded in these 10 departments. Antioquia had the highest numbers of 
IDPs in the period 2006-2016, with 403,396 IDPs (24% of the total), followed by Nariño, which 
recorded 343,269 IDPs (20%) and Valle del Cauca, with 227,516 IDPs (13%). As Figure 8 
shows, while the annual numbers of IDPs have undulated in the three most affected 
departments (peaking in 2007, when the paramilitary demobilisation process had completed), 
974,181 IDPs were recorded between 2006 and 2016. While the data show declines in 2015 
and 2016 (which is consistent with broader conflict dynamics and paramilitary expansion and 
consolidation, discussed above), the numbers of IDPs have been high in Antioquia, Nariño and 
Valle del Cauca since the GOC-FARC peace process was announced in 2012. More 
specifically, 374,224 IDPs were recorded in these departments during this period.   
Table 2. IDPs in Western Colombia, 2006-2016 
Armed group Number of IDPs % of total 
Antioquia 403,396 24% 
Atlántico 7,474 0% 
Bolívar 142,075 8% 
Chocó 165,699 10% 
Córdoba 129,011 8% 
Magdalena 130,677 8% 
Nariño 343,269 20% 
Putumayo 115,353 7% 
Sucre 50,059 3% 
Valle Del Cauca 227,516 13% 
Total 1,714,529 100% 
Source: RUV, n.d. 
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Figure 8: IDPs in Antioquia, Nariño and Valle Del Cauca, 2006-2016 
Source: RUV (n.d.) 
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organisations have recorded that the paramilitaries are typically the main perpetrators of forced 
displacement in Colombia. This resonates with data available from CODHES, which highlights 
that in 2012 and 2013 the principal perpetrators of forced displacement were Colombia’s 
successor paramilitary groups.95   
These observations are also supported by HRPV data recorded by CINEP. For instance, 
if the paramilitaries are responsible for much of the forced displacement in the departments 
discussed above, we should expect to see a high level of paramilitary violence in these areas 
since the means by which people are displaced involve violations of human rights. These 
HRPV data can therefore act as an indicator of armed group activity. Referring to Table 3, in 
Antioquia, Nariño, and Valle Del Cauca – the three departments of the 10 analysed that are 
most affected by forced displacement – the data indeed demonstrate that the paramilitaries were 
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guerrillas. More specifically, in Antioquia, 3,915 people (73% of the total HRPV victims 
recorded in this department) were victims of HRPV perpetrated by the paramilitaries, 421 
(38%) in Nariño, and 3,684 (77%) in Valle del Cauca. Overall, the paramilitaries were 
responsible for 72% of HRPV victims in these departments. 
 
Table 3. Percentage of HRPV victims by responsible group in Antioquia, Nariño, and 
Valle del Cauca, 2009-2016 
Department 
Public 
forces 
Para-
militarie
s 
Public 
armed 
forces / 
para-
militarie
s 
FARC ELN 
Guerrill
a unspec. 
Total 
Antioquia 
818  
(15%) 
3,915 
(73%) 
58 
(1%) 
512 
(10%) 
31 
(1%) 
0 
(0%) 
5,334 
(100%) 
Nariño 
252  
(23%) 
421  
(38%) 
29 
(3%) 
375 
(34%) 
15 
(1%) 
14 
(1%) 
1,106 
(100%) 
Valle Del Cauca 
985  
(21%) 
3,684 
(77%) 
32 
(1%) 
56 
(1%) 
1 
(0%) 
2 
(0%) 
4,760 
(100%) 
Total 
2,055 
(18%) 
8,020 
(72%) 
119 
(1%) 
943 
(8%) 
47 
(0%) 
16 
(0%) 
11,200 
(100%) 
Source: Data adapted from Banco de Datos de Derechos Humanos y Violencia Política del 
CINEP (n.d.) (As above, data exclude ‘other’ and ‘no information’) 
 
In the municipalities of Medellín (Antioquia), Buenaventura (Valle del Cauca), San 
Andrés de Tumaco (Nariño) and Cali (Valle del Cauca), CODHES records some of the highest 
numbers of forced displacement in Colombia.96 These municipalities are also paramilitary 
strongholds.97 For instance, in 2012, CODHES identified 24 cases of intra-urban displacement 
(i.e., displacement within cities), which were concentrated in six municipalities: Medellín, 
Buenaventura, and San Andrés de Tumaco, as well as Soacha (department of Cundinamarca), 
El Tarra (Norte de Santander) y Toribío (Cauca).98 In 22 (92%) of these cases, CODHES 
identifies successor paramilitaries groups as the responsible parties. CINEP also records cases 
of mass forced displacement that are attributed to the paramilitaries. For example, in one 
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instance of mass forced displacement in the municipality of Buenaventura, the paramilitaries 
were responsible for the mass displacement of 600 Afro-Colombian families in 2013.99  
The continuation of widespread forced displacement perpetrated by the paramilitaries 
and the dispossession of large swathes of land present indirect challenges to the current peace 
process. Land inequality and similar rural issues, such as access to land, are among the primary 
driving factors of political violence in Colombia.100 The FARC mobilised in 1964 motivated 
by rural inequalities.101 Paramilitary groups, such as the AUC, also trace their origins to the 
protection of large landowner assets and have practiced land-grabbing forced displacement 
towards the interests of large agri-business and the extractive industries. Land inequality has 
been a central issue among Colombia’s warring parties, as well as the country’s larger social 
networks and movements. Violent forced displacement historically has contributed to unequal 
land distribution.102  
Between 1980 and 2000, armed groups dispossessed peasants of an estimated 4.5 
million hectares of land and around 50% of the country’s most fertile land.103 By 2010, this 
rose to approximately 6.6 million hectares, equivalent to 13% of arable land. This does not 
include the territories of ethnic communities, the inclusion of which would augment these 
figures.104  Consequently, Colombia has one of the highest rates of land distribution inequality 
in the world.105 USAID estimated that ‘0.4% of the population owns 62% of the country’s best 
land’.106 Such rural inequalities form a central part of a complex socio-political context of 
exclusion that produces violence.107 Following episodes of forced displacement, the UNDP has 
recorded an increase in land concentration over the last decade primarily due to paramilitary 
forced displacement and assassinations.108 Between 2006 and 2009 the concentration of land 
ownership increased in 23 out of 32 departments in Colombia, and increased at higher rates in 
areas of intense continued paramilitary violence.109  
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Similar to the AUC, successor paramilitary forces are ‘legalising’ ownership of land 
acquired via violent means through a process of what Ballvé describes as ‘land laundering’.110 
Paramilitaries are concealing the origins of land acquisition through the use of ‘grassroots 
development’ initiatives. According to Ballvé ‘land laundering is not the one-off conversion of 
the illegal into the legal, but rather an on-going, everyday process of blurring any distinction 
between the two’.111 Moreover, Nilsson and Taylor highlight that the Institute for Rural 
Development (INCODER) ‘not only distributed land to pay political bills instead of 
compensating victims who were pushed off their land during the long conflict’, but the Institute 
‘also gave away land units to armed actors’.112 Land that was recuperated from imprisoned 
members of the AUC and subsequently auctioned off to landless victims is then ‘often bought 
up by paramilitary straw men and thus brought back into the hand of illegally armed group.’113 
Nilsson and Taylor also give the example of the National Land Fund (Fondo Nacional de 
Tierras, responsible for administering land controlled by ex-paramilitary members), which is 
accused of ‘distributing land units on the basis of bribes rather than legitimate claims and often 
ends up giving land to fake peasant associations, set up by ex-paramilitary groups’.114 Public 
notaries, inter alia, have also legalised the fraudulent transfers of land titles.115  
Further, even if land has been declared ready for restitution, people may be deterred 
from returning due to threats to both the actors who are involved in the land restitution process 
and to peasants returning to their land. Human rights organisations have documented successor 
paramilitary violence and threats against those seeking to reclaim land through the current land 
restitution frameworks.116  Reports of a paramilitary group calling itself the ‘Anti-Restitution 
Army’ with links to previous paramilitary formations has weakened the implementation of Law 
1448 and other restitution attempts.117 According to Human Rights Watch, acts of violence and 
threats against claimants have not only deterred many from returning to their lands, but also 
has forced many into displacement again, with a high level of impunity for those responsible.118 
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Amnesty International observes that representatives of indigenous and Afro-Colombian 
communities119 that are seeking recognition of land rights ‘have faced, and continue to face, 
serious human rights violations and abuses, primarily at the hands of paramilitaries’.120 In 
attempts to enforce existing restitution efforts, the Colombian government created a National 
Protection Unit in 2011.  With an expanded budget of $140 million a year, the program has 
protected around 500 land restitution leaders.121 However, this program has also had limited 
success in removing the threat to land claimants, and there has been ‘insufficient means of 
long-term security actor presence.’122  
The GOC has recognised the importance of agrarian reform and this has formed a 
central component of previous efforts towards peace. The 2011 ‘Victims and Land Restitution 
Law’ (Ley de Víctimas y Restitución de Tierras, Law 1448) aimed to compensate over a million 
victims of forced displacement.123 More recently, the GOC and FARC agreed early-on in the 
negotiations on their first agenda item: land reform and rural development. Much of GOC-
FARC accord on rural reform agreed in 2013, ‘Toward a New Colombian Countryside: Integral 
Rural Reform’, strikes at the heart of the conflict and constitutes a fundamental aspect of the 
current peace process. Negotiators agreed to a broad gamut of reforms including land access 
and use, new mechanisms for land restitution and formulisation of land rights and titles, and a 
variety of rural development policies.  
Both resistance to land reform and continued paramilitary violence threatens the 
implementation of land reform and rural development initiatives agreed as part of the GOC-
FARC peace negotiations. . If the government is unable to implement the reforms it has 
promised, as hitherto has been the case, it will have serious implications for the viability of the 
peace process.  Indeed, Amnesty International has noted the importance of sustainable land 
restitution to Colombia’s peace process, arguing that if Colombia’s authorities are unable to 
ensure that land restitution rights are effectively respected ‘as a matter of urgency’, then ‘not 
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only will Colombia be in breach of its international human rights obligations, but it risks 
leaving one of the principal causes of the armed conflict unresolved. This could have serious 
repercussions for the long-term viability of any eventual peace agreement.’124 
 
Conclusion 
This article has demonstrated that successor paramilitary groups continue to operate in 
Colombia and has argued that paramilitarism represents a potential challenge to the on-going 
peace process in Colombia in a number of different ways. Here we have focused on two. First, 
continued inter-group violence represents a direct spoiler threat. As long as paramilitary forces 
continue to espouse an anti-subversive stance as well as target and threaten FARC members, 
left-wing activists and community leaders, the GOC-FARC peace may well be precarious. 
Such violence may provoke the FARC into taking retaliatory measures and strengthens 
hardline positions, obstructs the FARC from participating effectively in politics, leads to 
potential splintering of the FARC, and thwarts real political and social change. Secondly, 
continued paramilitary violence in pursuit of their interests threaten the ability of the GOC to 
fulfil its end of the deal with the FARC, particularly in the areas of rural reform where 
paramilitary groups continue to forcibly displace large sections of rural populations and resist 
land restitution efforts. Both of these can serve as significant obstacles to implementing the 
agreed terms of the first point on the negotiation agenda regarding rural reform and 
development. Moreover, this forced displacement perpetrated by the paramilitaries exacerbates 
some of the root causes of Colombia’s conflict, which the negotiations aim to address. There 
are already indications that successor paramilitary groups threaten to undermine the agreed 
terms of the ‘Comprehensive Agricultural Development Policy’ by the continued expansion of 
paramilitary territorial presence throughout many areas of Colombia.  
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The GOC, within negotiations with the FARC, have agreed to address the paramilitary 
issue through a multi-dimensional approach which included the establishment of the Comision 
Nacional de Garantías de Seguridad. However, various obstacles prevent definitive action. 
First is the willingness of the GOC to address paramiltiarism. The government has hitherto 
been slow to address the successor paramilitary issue, partly due to the GOC’s focusing much 
of its attention elsewhere (such as the peace negotiations with the FARC and, later, with the 
ELN). Another obstacle is Colombia’s continued localised institutional connections with 
paramilitarism and internal political forces opposed to militarily targeting paramilitary groups. 
In many areas of the country the ties that bind the paramilitary-GOC relationship remains 
strongly rooted, primarily out of corruption and economic interests. Moreover, these concerns 
have been compounded by the recent election of Duque as president of Colombia amidst claims 
of his alleged links to paramilitary groups, as well as Duque’s close relationship with former 
president Álvaro Uribe, who has also faced allegations of links to Colombia’s paramilitaries.125 
Secondly, state capacity to address paramilitary violence is limited. The GOC simply lacks the 
resources and infrastructure to effectively replace paramilitary control in contested areas. The 
absence of state presence in many areas of Colombia is notable yet the GOC’s ability to exert 
institutional control will be central to the administration of more isolated rural areas. In this 
light, while the historical record of paramilitary spoiling has contributed to fears pertaining to 
the unwillingness of the Colombian state to protect demobilising guerrillas, there may also be 
a lack of state capacity to do so, regardless of how committed the GOC may now be in 
protecting demobilising FARC members. 
This analysis and the identification of related threats have implications for how the 
GOC manages the peace process and provides security for members of the FARC political 
party.126 Given the compelling evidence of the continuation of paramilitarism in Colombia, 
compounded with the FARC’s insistence that paramilitaries continue to operate across 
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Colombia, it is crucial that the GOC continue the process of dismantling paramilitary forces in 
Colombia and addresses the issues that give rise to paramilitarism. To do this, the GOC needs 
to address the continued state-paramilitary links, with a full appreciation of the gravity of the 
‘neo-paramilitary’ problem in Colombia. Domestic and international pressure can help make 
this happen.  
What can we learn from the Colombian case?  A key aim of this paper is to elucidate 
the case-based behaviour of Colombia’s successor paramilitary groups and the ways in which 
they might threaten the current peace process.  However, we can draw further from this analysis 
to identify possible directions for future research. In particular, developments in Colombia 
point to the long-term perils of state support for and/or mobilising of paramilitary forces or 
‘pro-government militias’, as part of the state’s counterinsurgency drive.127 Pro-government 
militias, like the paramilitaries in Colombia, are third actors in conflict. These groups typically 
have divergent interests from insurgent groups or are commonly anti-insurgent, mobilised as 
part of a state’s counterinsurgency programme. Yet, the interests of these militias can be 
complex and can often differ from those of the state.128 In conditions where such third actors 
are largely excluded from the peace process, such as in Colombia, these groups with a typically 
anti-insurgent ideology, divergent sets of interest and worldviews, and competing economic 
interests can increase the possibility of continued inter-group violence and therefore the 
possibility for spoiling. As a result, as new research has pointed to, conflicts in which pro-
government militias are present may be more difficult to resolve.129 Not only are multi-actor 
conflicts often more difficult to terminate,130 but the inter-field rivalries between groups, as 
analysed in Colombia above, often further fuels cycles of conflict.131 Future research could 
therefore help us to better understand how the presence of pro-government militias might have 
long-term implications for the prospects of peace. It might also address how states manage 
peace processes in the context of multiple armed groups.  
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Appendices  
Appendix 1.  
Information regarding CINEP’s data and author coding 
CINEP records a range of human rights violations and political violence, including extra-
judicial killings, disappearances, collective displacement, torture, arbitrary detention, 
individual and collective threats, kidnapping, sexual violence, etc. These violations are 
recorded by event, thus multiple instances of human rights violations and political violence can 
be recorded in a single event. For the purpose of analysis in this article, the data have been 
further coded to include only the victims of violent episodes, rather than the number of violent 
acts per event. Any potential problem of over-reporting human rights violations and political 
violence is therefore eliminated. A possible drawback, however, is that that single events can 
involve a large number of victims (some of these cases are discussed in the article). Episodes 
of mass forced displacement and mass threats are cases in point, especially when considering 
paramilitary actions. Nevertheless, in light of the attempts of the peace process to consider 
victims of the conflict, events that result in a large number of victims are pertinent to the 
analysis in this article. 
 
The data in this article thus consider victims of all categories of violence committed by all 
warring parties as recorded by CINEP. To do this, CINEP’s data have been further coded to 
better illustrate the authors of violent episodes. In other words, CINEP does not employ a 
consolidated code or category to identify authors of a particular event. For instance, a violent 
episode attributed to Colombia’s public armed forces can be recorded as Military Forces, 
Police, Air Force, Army, and so on. Moreover, multiple authors of violence (for example, 
Military Forces, Police, and Paramilitaries) can be recorded for a single event. For this article, 
in addition to coding CINEP’s data by victim, the data have also been further coded into 
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consolidated codes for the authors of violence, specifically (i) Public Forces, (ii) Paramilitaries, 
(iii) Combined Public Armed Forces/Paramilitaries, (iv) ELN, (v) FARC, (vi) Guerrilla 
unspecified. These data have also been compiled by year, author, number of victims, and 
department.    
The data show only the victims where an armed group could be identified as the 
perpetrator of HRPV. For instance, CINEP codes some instances as ‘no information’, as well 
as ‘combatants’ (e.g., victims of violence between armed groups). Once calculated, there were 
7,405 HRPV victims where an armed group could not be accurately identified in the 10 
departments analysed in this article, which, if included in the total sample, would represent 
33% of total victims. Since an armed group could not be identified, these data are omitted.  
 
Appendix 2.  
Information regarding data choices 
The department of Cauca – located south of Valle del Cauca and north of Nariño – has been 
omitted from this analysis. There is a particularly high level of HRPV in this department, with 
23,947 victims recorded (CINEP, 2015). A large number (10,787) were victims of violence 
perpetrated by Colombia’s public armed forces. However, there were 10,301 victims whereby 
an armed group could not be accurately identified; for instance, when CINEP codes the incident 
as ‘combatants’ following an episode of armed conflict. With this in mind, a decision has been 
taken to omit Cauca. 
 
Appendix 3. 
Information on interviews and questionnaires 
Interviews were conducted with members of the FARC in both April and July 2017 in three 
different FARC demobilisation camps or transition zones (Zonas Veredales Transitorias de 
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Normalización) across different regions of Colombia to ensure a geographical spread of 
respondents.  The three FARC camps were located in Cordoba, Meta/Guaviare and Cauca.  The 
respondents were FARC members in the process of ‘demobilisation’ (referred to as 
‘reincorporation’ in Colombia) who occupied various positions within the organisation, 
including commander, sub-commander, militia, negotiator (in Havana, Cuba) and soldier. 
Respondents were from various age groups (between 30-75 years old). We interviewed an 
equal number of female and male fighters. The respondents’ identities have been withheld to 
ensure respondent anonymity. As part of the structured interviews, FARC members were also 
given a questionnaire which consisted of 50 questions on their perception of threats emanating 
from various actors. Most of the questions were scale gauges or multiple choice; however, 
some open-ended questions were included. Of the 20 interviewees, four did not want to 
complete the questionnaire. As such, a total of 16 questionnaires were completed.   
 In-depth interviews were carried out with two former AUC leaders (who were among 
the founders of the organisation) and one of their lawyers in Medellin in July 2017. Their names 
have been withheld for anonymity.  
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